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Methodological Problems of Dealing with Disarmament in the Press

1. By Way of an Introduction: Five Scenarios

First Scenario

On May 21, 1935 the Chancellor of a European government made a speech before his Parliament in which, towards the end, he stated:

When present-day Germany espouses the cause of peace, it does not do so from a position of weakness or pusillanimity. It espouses peace on the grounds of National Socialism's different concept of nation and state. This ideology sees no desirable political aim in forcing one nation to integrate with another one alien to it, but sees any such event as a threat to internal unity and hence to national security for a long time to come. [...] Every war starts by consuming the flower of the nation. Since, however, Europe has no more unoccupied living space, any conquest can only lead to a rise in population that would in no way mitigate Europe's root problem.

[...] I started the Nazi revolution by creating the movement I have since led to victory. I realize that we will all only experience the first stirrings of this great revolutionary development. So what else should I desire but peace and tranquility? If the objection is raised that only the leadership desires this, then my response would be: Only the leader and the government need to desire peace - nations never desire war! Germany needs peace and wants peace.¹

The speaker in question had already presented this call for peace at length in an interview given to the Polish journal *Gazeta Polska* (January 26, 1935) which was then taken up and discussed in his own national press. The London *Times* also came out in praise of this appeal for peace in its issue of May 23, 1935. It is not too difficult to recognize that this official government statement formed part of a speech by Adolf Hitler to the German Reichstag. Hitler's appeal and the ensuing press comments are typical of the frequently repeated declarations of peace by the Nazi leadership from 1933 to 1935. Such declarations sought to distract attention away from the rearmament plans of the Nazis backed by the German armaments industry from 1935 onwards. This was followed in 1936 by the military occupation of the Rhineland and German military support for Franco in the Spanish Civil War, the annexation of Austria in 1938, and the occupation of Czechoslovakia and invasion of Poland in 1939.

First Inference: Even though the press may be full of talk about peace, rearmament and war preparations, war may - in certain political circumstances - nevertheless be underway.

Second Scenario

As clearly shown in the 1980 IAMCR (International Association for Mass Communication Research) study on the images of foreign countries presented in the press of some 30 countries, almost every country's press concentrates mainly on reporting events occurring in its own region.

In Latin America, one third of the reported news items are regional. Mexico looks towards the United States for news items, whereas Argentina and Brazil look more towards Western Europe because of former colonial links and, to a certain extent, also towards the Middle East. In Africa, the demand for regional news currently runs high because of the elections in Rhodesia and the downfall of Idi Amin in Uganda. Six of the seven African countries covered by the study are interested first in regional news, then in news about the Middle East as their territorial gate-way to Europe and Asia, and only third in news about Western Europe due to earlier colonial ties with France and England. In the press of the Middle East almost 50 percent of all news items are regional, the rest being divided between West Europe, Africa and the USA, with only the Lebanon focusing considerable interest upon East Europe. Regional reportage in the Asian press is about 40 percent. Australia and India exhibit an Anglophonic preference, while Indonesia and Thailand look more towards West Europe and the Middle East. The press in East Europe exhibits the least interest in regional news.² Studies show that the press in developing countries reports very little on the nuclear arms race, disarmament negotiations and the activities of the peace movements in the USA and West Europe.

Second Inference: If a national press reports little about the arms race, this does not necessarily imply that the respective country is not interested in peace. The press of some countries may consider factors such as hunger, famine, disease and foreign pressure to be of greater interest to readers than reports on the nuclear arms race between the major powers.

Third Scenario

In his study on the Iranian press, Amir Taheri notes:

The Persian daily newspaper *Kayhan* took the first step. On October 10, 1978 it appeared with a huge photograph of Khomeini on its front page, capped by a giant headline announcing the possibility of the Ayatollah's imminent return. Within a few hours, some 700,000 copies of the paper were sold in Tehran alone. Thus began a circulation war among Iranian newspapers in

which Khomeini's pictures and statements provided the *pièces de résistance*.³

Similar reactions are reported in A. Wadi's analysis of the Iranian press during the last days of the Shah's regime.⁴ It is of interest to note here that some Iranian journalists circumvented the Shah's strict censorship by writing critically about conditions in foreign countries in such a way as to imply criticism of the political repression in their own. Readers were readily capable of recognizing this indirect criticism of the Shah's regime. There is apparently a delicate balance between a censored press and reader credibility. Once the discrepancy between the ideology imposed upon the press from above and the daily experience of its readers becomes too great, journalists and readers alike enter a secret alliance in coding and decoding press reports contrary to official intentions.

Third Inference: When a national press writes far more about peace and disarmament than about the social problems experienced daily by its readers, then the readers will not take that press very seriously.

Fourth Scenario

In his 1982 study, German political scientist Lothar Kalka, analyzed the discussion of the neutron bomb in the West German press.⁵ In his quantitative and qualitative analysis he examined in depth the press reports appearing in the national dailies *Die Welt*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and *Frankfurter Rundschau* during the period June 6, 1977 to April 9, 1978.

In accord with earlier studies Kalka determined a considerable increase in West German press reporting on military policy. The neutron bomb was discussed during the period analyzed in 107 articles in *Die Welt*, 106 in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and 70 in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*. Analyzing the substance of these articles Kalka discovers that the conservative *Die Welt* approves the deployment of the neutron bomb within the strategic framework of flexible response, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* maintains a balance between the pros and cons, while the socialdemocratic *Frankfurter Rundschau* generally rejects the neutron bomb. All three newspapers made above-average use of commentaries, background information and interviews. Kalka concludes:

The neutron bomb discussion was scarcely conducted critically, i.e. from the aspect of political strategy. [...] Coverage was of greater quantitative than qualitative force. The question as to what the neutron bomb means within the context of the security of the Federal Republic and whether its political price is justified was barely touched upon. The frequency of press items that fall under the category of "further information" shows the reporting to incline towards

personalization and dramatization, and to concentrate upon isolated topical or sensational events. [...] No significant differences of a general nature appear to exist between the individual newspapers, although disparities may be noted in the handling of details. On the whole the quality of discussion remains on an even level.⁶

Fourth Inference: *In West European industrialized nations, the intensive reporting on the nuclear arms race tallies more readily with the mass media's tendency to indulge in dramatization, sensationalism, personalization, etc. rather than to provide explanations based upon rational analyses, background reports, discussions, etc.*

Fifth Scenario

In the West German *Handbuch der Weltpresse* (Handbook of the World's Press), the reference to the press of the USSR concludes:

The position of the press and all other mass communication media can only be understood within the context of the Soviet society in general, which is not primarily influenced and directed by divergent interests but solely by those of a single political party.⁷

This characterization of the Soviet press can be rejected outright as rigid anticommunism without seriously jeopardizing the author's academic qualifications as an analyst. Although almost no quantitative or qualitative analyses are available concerning the treatment of certain topics - such as Third World countries - in the press of Eastern bloc countries, a 1979 analysis by Egbert Jahn und Jutta Tiedke of the presentation of Soviet détente policy in Soviet magazines⁸ could well provide a useful starting point for a discriminating discussion. In their qualitative analysis the two authors examine the treatment of the problems of security and cooperation policies in the 1969 issues of the following magazines: *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* (International Life), *Kommunist* (Communist), *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoseniya* (World Economy and International Relations) and *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil* (Communist of the Armed Forces).

Before dealing with the specific interest and function of each magazine, the authors make it clear that none of the magazines reflect anti-détente tendencies. Since, however, the subject of military threats is not treated uniformly, the authors conclude that some magazines are more reserved with regard to détente policy than others. In its 1969 issues the armed forces mouthpiece *Kommunist voorukzhennykh sil*, for example, does not refer to détente with the West in a single article and reduces the security-through-policy option to "security through arms"; the magazines *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn* and *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoseniya* are far more positive in their editorial policy.

This situation poses a multitude of theoretical problems. Although in the countries of Eastern Europe one cannot speak of a class society in the sociological sense due to the state control of the means of production, it is nevertheless possible to determine the influence of diverse interest groups.

***Fifth Inference:** Even though no anti-détente press media are operative in the socialist states, a close content analysis will nevertheless reveal which print and other media are used by interest groups to voice their views on the arms race and détente, and which of these groups are able in this way to influence public opinion.*

These five scenarios, to which various others could be added, are presented to show that an international cultural comparison by way of content analysis of the treatment of the arms race and détente by the press and other media will bear scholarly fruit only as long as it is appropriately embedded in an historical and social structure analysis of the national system in question.

2. Peace and Media Analysis

Within the framework of its past history, constitution, accomplishments and present program, UNESCO has always been dedicated to the concept of peace. This is true not only in a moral and political sense, but also as regards international law. Although the various UNESCO resolutions passed with regard to peace are not binding in international law as far as treaties are concerned, they can nevertheless be considered legally binding in character. Long before the controversial mass media debate concerning UNESCO and the peace-promoting role of the press, another mass medium - the school textbook - was assigned a peace-promoting function. It is of interest at this point to recapitulate briefly on the long-term work performed by UNESCO and other institutions in the field of peace-promotion through school textbooks. The international revision of school textbooks was attempted in the United States as long ago as the beginning of this century through, for example, studies initiated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

These studies became increasingly important after World War I under the auspices of the League of Nations. In 1926, the League of Nations' Casares Resolution attempted with small success to persuade league members to agree to the mutual revision of school textbooks. Somewhat more successful was an agreement on 40 controversial points in Franco-German relations concluded in 1935 through the private initiative of teachers' organizations in both countries. In Northern Europe, *Föreningen Norden*, founded in 1919, succeeded in getting the subject of peace dealt with in numerous Scandinavian school textbooks. The 1928 Historians' Congress in Oslo was also influential in this connection. Walter Mertineit in a 1937 declaration demonstrated just how controversial questions of school textbook revision are:

It was a characteristic feature of the League of Nations era that only 15 small to medium-sized states signed the Declaration on the Teaching of History drafted in 1937. All the larger powers rejected the Declaration, albeit for different reasons. The British opposed all outside interference in educational matters. The USA refused to sign because education does not come under federal control. France insisted on upholding the independence of teachers and historians. Nazi Germany rejected the principles of the Declaration as a whole. The Declaration had been the outcome of the League's long-term continuous endeavor to formulate a constructive plan of operation.

In the period between the wars there had been widespread agreement on the role of teachers, historians textbook authors, school authorities, etc., in putting an end to the "drum and fife" approach to teaching history, in stamping out chauvinism and prejudice and teaching in its place reconciliation and international understanding. Since nation states will not readily accept a purely international approach to the teaching of history, strategies had to be developed for at least bilateral or, where feasible, multilateral revision. The interested parties accordingly formulated rules of conduct and even considered the right to appeal to the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation for arbitration whenever any two countries failed to reach an understanding.⁹

It was not until after many decades of effort following World War II that the Peace Mission of the mass medium school textbook found general acceptance. The International Textbook Research Institute was founded in Braunschweig, West Germany in 1951 with the support of UNESCO. Under its aegis, numerous congresses and symposia were organized, resolutions passed and treaties concluded. Promising talks are currently in progress on the revision of history and geography in German and Polish school textbooks. The cultural agreement of June 13, 1976 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland pays tribute to the work of their bilateral Textbook Commission.

Parallel to the new peace movements in the United States, West Europe and Japan, the topic of "Peace and Textbook" is again under discussion in academic circles as well as among the general public. In Japan, public criticism of the inadequate information provided in school textbooks on the nuclear devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is on the increase.¹⁰ In West Europe, a recently published analysis comparing the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, France, Switzerland, the UK and Poland notes that war is treated in the textbooks as a constant quantity, but not peace.¹¹ Before the theoretical and methodological results of 50 years of research in international textbook revision are applied to the subjects of the arms race and the détente under discussion in the press, I shall first examine the trend to date briefly.

Contrary to the peace mission of the textbook, the mission of the press has never as yet been

clearly defined, but only sporadically explored by the League of Nations and UNESCO. Analyses of the presentation of war and peace in the press have been yielded by individual research activities.¹² An institutional start was made with the 1978 UNESCO Mass Media Declaration (Article III):

The mass media have an important contribution to make in the promotion of peace and international understanding by opposing racism, apartheid, human rights violations and incitements to war, and thereby helping to overcome ignorance and misunderstandings between nations.

The contribution of the press is already intimated in the title of this declaration. The expression “the promotion of peace” does not imply a passive role for the press, which should indeed actively engage itself for peace and not merely abstain from warmongering. As already shown elsewhere,¹³ a multitude of links of various kinds exists between the connotations peace/arms race/détente on one hand and press/mass media/communication on the other.

As shown in detail in the present study, the category “Content” - from the practical as well the theoretical viewpoint - must be understood as a function of the interplay between the categories production, effects and history (or vice versa). The theory of the American communication scholar, Phillips Davison, according to which “Any communication must be about something; one cannot escape ultimately dealing with content”¹⁴ simply implies that whoever is concerned with the content of mass media cannot avoid having to analyze its historical and social embodiment in the conditions of production and consumption. This idea can also be grasped technologically, for it is the inherent laws governing a specific communication or information technology that reinforce, admit or prohibit the communication of a certain content.

When certain Western nations participating in the UNESCO debate on communication policy demand that UNESCO abjure all interest in the content of the media, then they are demanding nothing less than the exclusion of the theoretical and methodological treatment of communication problems.** It is in this context that UNESCO activities in the field of textbook revision assume importance in the press debate. After all, it has been generally accepted that the revision of the contents of the mass medium textbooks should represent one more small step in the direction of peace.

The textbook debates of the past fifty years could also provide a methodological basis for

* In the 115th Session, September 17-28, 1982, of UNESCO Executive Board, the USA, FRG, Denmark i.a. demanded that communication should not be used as a tool for achieving any such goal as peace and development. Moreover the USA emphasized that UNESCO should not permit itself to become involved in studies which touched upon communication.

enriching the debate on content with reference to the press. Since the textbook debate has traditionally been conducted by members of the teaching profession, its methodology for content analysis was of a therapeutic nature and qualitative rather than quantitative. The methodology traditionally used for analyzing the press was always very different. As it was most often performed by political scientists, its methodology was oriented towards empirical social research. It is thus hardly a coincidence that the first systematic and quantitative content analyses were conducted on political propaganda material by the US War Department in World War II.

It is largely due to progress in structural approaches to empirical communication research over the past 15 years that the isolated analysis of the mass media contents must be seen as scientific regression. To plan a content analysis of the presentation of the arms race and détente in the press in concrete terms would mean that the conditions of production and consumption, be they the promotion of peace or warmongering, should be taken into account in the research methodology employed. It may be said in conclusion that content analysis is only practical if it is at the same time medium analysis, i.e., if it further takes into account the conditions of production and consumption. In this context the need for research discussed by James Halloran in 1974 still applies.¹⁵

3. Disarmament in the West German Press

As Jürgen Habermas forcefully argued in his *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*¹⁶ (Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere), the middle-class public in an absolutist state forms a reasoning audience that reacts to governmental measures as a critical and controlling factor. In such a model critics are admittedly excluded from political power. The *raison d'être* of present-day Western democracies corresponds to an even more far-reaching model of critical public opinion: citizens have not only to be critics of governmental decisions, but the bourgeois public should itself constitute the system and form the basis of and condition for social organization and power.¹⁷

Any real structural transformation in West European industrial societies will, however, prevent the critical public from effectively assuming its role. Any tendency towards structural transformation will force the (social and welfare) state to interfere increasingly in the private sphere of the individual, thereby reducing the latter's autonomous sphere of responsibility in the face of an increasing number of power centers. Military publications likewise fall in line with this procedure. On the one hand, they have to remain critical and fulfill the dual function of correctly reproducing and editing military, strategic, technological and détente material as dealt with in journals dedicated to science and technology.

The political press in Germany should examine the results of the strategy discussions in so far as these bear upon social and political matters.¹⁸

On the other hand they must judge the extent to which organizational power in the military sphere can be influenced by public opinion. In military matters public opinion is confronted with a basic contradiction between bourgeois thinking and military ethos. Gerhard Brandt and Ludwig von Friedeburg have observed:

Irrespective of the class background of the military leadership caste, its members ultimately aim at the collective use of power and are in this respect diametrically opposed to the domain of productive work and peaceful commerce. The relationship between the military apparatus and bourgeois society always remains antagonistic and communication between the two remains problematic.¹⁹

Due to the nuclear overkill capacity of both friend and foe during the nuclear age, the militarily novel possibility of mutually assured destruction is shared by both aggressor and victim. This makes it more difficult than in the past to distinguish between aggressive and defensive action, or between a just and an unjust war. In this situation national security is not feasible without détente, which is only achievable through communication and public discussion. For détente to be negotiable, reliable information on the weaponry of the potential foe has to be accessible. The mutual exchange of information on armaments between rival nations is, however, insufficient: the nuclear age demands nothing less than “public inspection”.²⁰

It is difficult to define the actual relationship between public opinion and détente in the Federal Republic of Germany because this has hardly ever been seriously analyzed. The social sciences have been crassly negligent in this respect. Two recent news items demonstrate, however, that this relationship is relatively insubstantial.

1. In 1960 a sensational article in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* raised serious doubts about the Federal German army's defense capability against a possible attack by socialist countries. As reported by the French political scientist Alfred Grosser and others²¹, this gave rise to a serious constitutional crisis in Bonn, but failed to provoke any public discussion concerning the military capacity of the Federal Republic in an East-West conflict.
2. Until far into the 1970s no controversial debates ever occurred in the Bonn parliament concerning the annual defense budget. During the annual budget debates the Opposition invariably voted against all items in the government's budget except for defense items.

The limited number of content analyses of the treatment of détente and security by the West German press yielded the following conclusions, the value of which is questionable because they

are rarely based upon the methodology and criteria of critical theory described below in Section 4.

Gerhard Brandt and Ludwig von Friedeburg (1966) conducted a qualitative analysis (using the methodology of critical theory) of West German press coverage in the 1960s of the proposed purchase of Swiss Mirage fighter planes, the alleged missile gap in the USA and the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The national dailies and weeklies addressed themselves to three major themes: deterrence, defense, détente. Fundamental political decisions governing the security policy of West Germany were not questioned and no alternatives were discussed.²²

In 1969 von Bredow conducted a qualitative analysis of media reports on the ombudsman's 1963 annual report on the Federal German army in 35 dailies, weeklies and monthlies as well as in all relevant radio and TV commentaries. The army ombudsman of the day, ex-Vice-Admiral Hellmuth Heye, former MP for the conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union), had his annual report published in a popularized form in the magazine *Quick* in the summer of 1964. Heye dramatically warned against restorative and antidemocratic tendencies in the Federal German army. Von Bredow focused attention upon the subsequent press coverage, concluding that the press had not exercised its critical public function and had even succumbed to the obstructive influence of government-controlled public relations.²³

In two theoretical studies (1975, 1979) Christian Potyka examined the relationship between the Federal German army and the public, concluding that the mass media play no significant role in the discussion of security policy. In general the West German mass media merely inform the public of the prevailing views of the political elite; they have never been particularly critical of the Federal German army and even media that used to voice criticism in earlier years have since acquiesced to the prevailing doctrine of deterrence.²⁴

In a theoretical text in 1980 Anton-Andreas Guha analyzed press coverage of the NATO decision of December 12, 1979, concluding that the press had concocted a Manichean view of the world, manipulated statistics when comparing armaments and ignored expert studies that question the doctrine of deterrence. Guha finally concludes:

Federal German press reporting on the complex problem of shadow trading in weapons must be regarded as a flop.²⁵

In 1982 Matthias Wegener arrived at similar conclusions in his quantitative content analysis (sometimes a little weak in methodology and theory) of the treatment of the NATO rearmament resolution in two West German regional newspapers.²⁶ As stated earlier, Lothar Kalka demonstrated (in 1982) in a quantitative-cum-qualitative content analysis that West German press reporting on the neutron bomb had been grossly superficial.²⁷ The most recent qualitative analysis is by Kurt Kister (1983), who studied West German press coverage of the first-strike capability discussion after 1977.

He reveals that the conservative national dailies *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* were the only ones to treat the discussion seriously. The other dailies supported the first-strike idea, but failed to back it up with a rational argument.

All the major dailies came out in favor of the NATO doctrine of flexible response without discussing the alternative defense concept.²⁸ It is of interest at this point to note that political figures representing all shades of opinion complained of the inadequate reporting on military policy by the West German press. The conservative politician, Lothar Rühl, observed:

For many years only two West German dailies with a nationwide circulation, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt*, have published articles and reports on defense and security issues. Even today systematic reports and comments on these topics only appear regularly in these two dailies, while others, such as Munich's *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, tend to satisfy their readers' interest with a limited amount of copy covering security, arms control and defense.²⁹

Günther Gaus, a Social Democratic intellectual, criticized press reports on the Geneva disarmament talks in the following terms:

With few exceptions the coverage of the missile debate by the press as well as radio and TV commentators has become totally lukewarm in terms of ideas and language. Analyses and commentaries by columnists and ordinary journalists alike are composed of stock arguments couched in empty phraseology.³⁰

In conclusion it may be said - always with the necessary reserve concerning the use of methodology - that West German press reporting on the arms race and détente is incapable of aiding readers to form a personal critical assessment of the value of military and strategic decisions. This seems to be especially true with regard to biochemical warfare, although, according to the Stockholm Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the requisite expert information is readily accessible to the readers of science and technology journals. These tentative conclusions need, however, to be empirically reinforced by further studies.³¹

4. Content Analysis and Critical Theory

A critical confrontation with the methodology of content analysis automatically implies confrontation with positivist epistemology in the social sciences. Although this positivist epistemology is deeply rooted in the North American scientific tradition, such confrontation will not be limited to the social sciences in the USA alone. Since North American social research based

on science and technology and education and culture transfer attained global importance after 1945, a critique of positivism will likewise imply a critique of the current global concept of empirical social research. Although Marxist communication research has, on the theoretical plane, always disavowed positivism, it nevertheless falls back upon positivism in numerous concrete content analysis studies.

This is not surprising. Although Marxist epistemology is historically rooted in the Enlightenment and in German idealism, whereas its theoretical relevance evolved empirically from the workers' movement, its historical link with French positivism is evident in the works of Karl Marx. The positivist contribution to Marxism is manifest in its understanding of technique and technology, but is further determinable from content analysis. For abrogating reification in Marxist epistemology, theoretical contradiction cannot be excluded when quantitative, i.e., highly reified, methods are employed to this end. This primacy of quantitative methodology is reflected by a bureaucratized world characterized by the mediatization, finalization and formalization of human communication.

Although the phenomena of quantified and bureaucratized capitalist and socialist worlds stem from different sources, all produce reification. The primacy of quantitative methodology in content analysis reveals "one-dimensional thinking" (Herbert Marcuse) and, being only an expression of "instrumental reason" (Max Horkheimer), have either very limited validity or are simply a scientific reflection of reification instead of placing it critically in question.

Once we start to criticize the methodology of content analysis within the limited frame of positivist thinking, we are forced to consider the obviously negligent treatment of semantic aspects, the frequency-counting orientation upon which all methodological analyses are based, and the essentially unresolved problems of reliability and validity. Even if the foregoing demands were met, content analysis would still not come up to the critical standards of sociology based on critical theory.

Positivist methodology in content analysis is marked by a tendency to quantify all social data for the purpose of assessment. Epistemologically it is oriented towards the primacy of quantification in the physical sciences. As explained by John C. McKinney: "We wanted to start measuring social phenomena immediately with all the precision of the physical sciences."³² Suffering from an inferiority complex for not having as yet attained in the field of the social sciences the objectivity of the physical sciences, content analysis based on critical theory must sooner or later encounter difficulties due to the fact that it overlooks phenomena that should be of interest in all social-scientific epistemology. Or, according to Dallas W. Smythe, content analysis oriented towards the primacy of quantification reveals an "immaturity of science in which objectivity is confused with quantification."³³

The pursuit of objectivity in empirical social studies is a wild goose chase. Its modified form - the pursuit of "near-objectivity" and reliability - is marked by the same fanciful characteristics.

What is needed is an objectivity that yields precise and plausible socio-scientific results, not an objectivity which, due to subjective factors, is already problematic in terms of choosing what to study. Proceeding beyond semantics, a critique of quantitative content analysis is desired because its methodology involves the fragmentation of textual content. As noted by Max Horkheimer:

The subsumption of similar results in abstract categories causes their primary aspects to be presented in a false light, or even totally obfuscated. Instead of the conditions under which people exist, or the objective function they perform in society, subjective reflections often come to the fore. Without critical reflections about whether the behavior and convictions of individuals have been subsumed or induced by society, empirical social science research [along with quantitative content analysis, J.B.] falls victim to its own results.³⁴

Quantitative content analysis thus describes an existing situation instead of placing it in question.³⁵ Ideology-critical qualitative content analysis based on critical theory takes account of the ambiguity, irrationality and ideological conformity of the studied text.³⁶ It will apply to the text on the one hand a critical theory capable of identifying a form of society that should be rejected, and on the other existing political and socioeconomic power structures and relationships. Critical analysis methodology also continuously probes initial qualitative data such as purpose, objectives, hypotheses, evidence collection and general theoretical content, and, as has been shown, excludes quantitative analysis due to the inflexibility of category formation and its concept of reliability.

The ideology-critical method stands in contrast to quantitative content analysis. Relying on the integrity of the studied text structure, it seeks the contextual significance of the notions, symbols and arguments used in the text. Ideology critique comprehends text structures as specific expressions of collective social interest, whereby ideology is defined as “historically transparent knowledge unconscious of its dependence”.³⁷ The methodologically constituent comparison between the theoretical knowledge of an object and its concrete presentation should be expressed by comparing the results of peace and disarmament research in the press.

The following qualitative methodologies are available as concrete forms of analysis.³⁸

1. *Analysis of social conditions*: Such an analysis should take into account the operating conditions of the mass medium under study, e.g., the press (production and consumption) as well as the subject under study, e.g., détente.
2. *Analysis of the historical context of the subject under study*: Most content analyses, whether quantitative or qualitative, operate without an historical context and disregard the fact that ideas, concepts, opinions, topics and ideologies always have a historico-ideological context that leaves a decisive mark on the present at a

pre-communicative level.

3. *Analysis of verbal provocations:* Verbal provocations are pre-communicatively imparted notions whose mere mention in a text will initiate associative communication and a teaching process between the readers and the medium without the affectivity of the notion being immanently clear within the text.
4. *Analysis of the latent content:* Every text explicitly contains only part of what it seeks to express. What the author ideologically considers to be self-evident is omitted.
5. *Deficit analysis:* a) Arguments and conclusions that have been suppressed by the media as well as their causes and functions should be examined as they appear in the connotation of the text structure. b) Information on a specific topic that the media have suppressed should be studied to establish the social relevance of omissions for promoting a given ideology.
6. *Analysis of involuntarily revealed content:* Every text consciously or unconsciously reveals motives that the author would like to suppress. Such mechanisms can be raised to the state of awareness by psychoanalysis and social psychology (analysis of anxiety, repression, projection, errors, etc.), these being of particular value in the analysis of ideologies.
7. *Analysis of extreme connotation:* According to Theodor W. Adorno it is acceptable that the momentum of recurrence of the eccentric and unusual and things having a certain relevance to the theory should have a key function in the decoding of an entire text.³⁹
8. *Analysis of microstructure:* Again according to Adorno it is acceptable that the microanalysis of text structures should reveal things which elude the imprint of generality. Ideologies that are otherwise concealed by conformity with official consciousness become especially apparent in the details of a text.⁴⁰
9. *Analysis of the political in the apolitical:* It must be accepted that the political attitudes of a consumer are formed or reinforced less by manifest political reporting on the part of a print medium than by political stances in entertainment reporting that are imparted in passing or more or less spontaneously. A good example for this phenomenon is a press photograph in the Swedish morning newspaper *Dagens Nyheter* of August 14, 1982. Two beaming Swedish army officers are shown welcoming a French Exocet missile with open arms; the large missile occupies the whole of the foreground of the picture. The bold headline to the photograph reads: "My happiest day!" In this way the picture and the headline cover a completely different event in every-day life, namely a newly fledged father taking his newborn baby from the arms of his wife and proclaiming radiantly: "My happiest day!"⁴¹

Finally, the following should be noted in the context of a qualitative content analysis, which

should, for instance, employ the foregoing nine methodologies. Quantitative analyses here have a different value from that of positivist scientism. Aware of the basically restricted validity of quantitative content analyses, the reduction of textual reality to mathematical connections between numbers there practiced is suitable as a structuring aid for qualitative ideology-critical analysis. Quantitative results cannot present the empirical proof of assertions contained in the text (as positivism would require), but can, however, enhance the precision and plausibility of qualitative analyses.

5. Recommendations

The MacBride report *Many Voices, One World* presented an impressive conceptual global minimum consensus regarding the future forms and contents of a new international information order. Due to its principal instructions, the report had to leave many questions unanswered and could not develop an allround concept for democratizing information and communication. Every national press system is subject to exogenous as well as endogenous influences. In numerous developing countries especially, the exogenous influences on the national press system are greater than the endogenous influences, and it is this particular difference that comes out very clearly in the MacBride Report.

To support the 1978 UNESCO Mass Media Declaration, i.e., to work actively for disarmament, endogenous changes are required in all national presses. It is interesting to note in this context that relatively harsh criticism of the press has grown in intensity in the politically most divergent regions of the earth. The three following remarks have been chosen because they do not derive from opposition politicians or regime critics. Representative of the developing countries is the self-criticism of the press in Sudan leveled by Mahjoud Mohammed Salih, a journalist who played an important role in the nationalization of the Sudanese press in 1970:

Although there are many statements from the government, including the President, about the freedom of the press, as a reader I don't sense this freedom in press criticism. There is a complete lack of initiative. They wait, for instance, until the President attacks the civil service before they become inundated with articles and letters on the subject.⁴²

Representative of the socialist countries is the following excerpt from a declaration of May 7, 1979 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union:

Serious negative factors which often substantially degrade the effectivity of educational efforts to influence people's consciousness and feelings are literary formalism, empty phraseology, stock arguments and the mechanical repetition of truisms instead of creative presentation and

lively formulation. In place of competent theoretical treatment backed by in-depth analyses and cogent reasoning that would enlighten readers, one encounters bombastic language, superficial erudition and pedantry. All these negative factors in our daily work need to be eradicated.⁴³

Finally, representative of the capitalist nations, we are able to quote a critical assessment of the press system in the Federal Republic of Germany by Paul Sethe, a West German conservative journalist:

Freedom of the press is the freedom of two hundred wealthy people to disseminate their opinion. [...] But do people who are of a different opinion have the right to express it? The Constitution grants them this right; economic reality nullifies it. Whoever is wealthy is free. [...] Journalists, not being wealthy, are not free.⁴⁴

If the validity of the foregoing self-critical insights that the press rarely, if at all, comes up to its self-imposed standards is accepted, practical countermeasures should be undertaken. What applies to press coverage of general news applies to an even greater extent to its treatment of the subject of disarmament. In our nuclear era inadequate press reporting on the threat of a nuclear holocaust could have fatal results. As to the problem of how the press should treat news concerning disarmament and the arms race, four scientifically-based conclusions are to be drawn:

1. Research must be intensified, amplified, systematized and coordinated.
2. Content analysis is only scientifically useful when embedded in an analysis of the exogenous and endogenous influences within the existing society.
3. Content analysis is only scientifically useful when embedded in an analysis of the conditions of the media (history, production, consumption) within the existing society.
4. Content analysis is only scientifically useful if the primacy of quantification is abandoned in favor of synthesized quantitative and qualitative methodologies.

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